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Review Article
Researching Poverty and the Poor
JOHN VEIT-WILSON
J. Bradshaw and R. Sainsbury (eds.) (2000), Researching Poverty, Aldershot:
Ashgate.
B. S. Rowntree (2000), Poverty. A Study of Town Life. New edition with an
introduction by Jonathan Bradshaw, Bristol: The Policy Press.
K. Van den Bosch [2001], Identifying the Poor Using Subjective and Consen-
sual Measures. Aldershot: Ashgate.
JSP, 31, 2002, DOI: 10.1017/S0047279402006724
Is there any hope of ever achieving clarity in the argument about what poverty
is and what to do about it? Imagine arguing about how to diagnose and treat ‘ill-
ness’ if there were as little agreement in the worlds of public health and private
medicine, each with their preventative and curative aspects, as there is about
poverty. Is there one illness or are there many? Is it malaise, indisposition, infec-
tion, injury, impairment, handicap or disability? Does it need medicines or
surgery – or the alteration of patients’ minds or their environments? This sim-
plistic analogy closely reflects the ‘poverty’ situation. Common usage talks of
poverty but creates many poverties and differing ways of researching them,
quite apart from the often unexamined question of focusing on the nature of
poverty or the characteristics of the poor, by no means identical. Further, while
many contentiously disparate methods are each appropriate for different varied
purposes and in varying circumstances (as is obvious in the medical analogy),
few poverty authors acknowledge the need to circumscribe their projects – if
they have only scalpels, all problems need surgery. Few distinguish between
concepts and methods appropriate for social analysis and the different needs of
policy prescription, often leading to criticism of the former for not suiting the 
latter.
These problems exemplify deep-seated and fundamental conflicts and unex-
plored misunderstandings even between research methodologists about dis-
courses and paradigms, means and ends, descriptions and prescriptions, values
and strategies. In some circles it is deliberately fashionable at present to obscure
the differences between a commonplace meaning of poverty (as a measurable
lack of material resources, chiefly cash, sufficient for conventionally defined but
measurable decent minimal social participation) and deprivations and inequali-
ties in general, as well as the many diffuse weak and strong notions of social
exclusion (covering everything from lack of fungible personal or social resources
to the consequences of the combinations of deficits and even to power-holders’
negatively discriminating activities which are often hard to specify precisely and
mostly impossible to measure exactly). No wonder the UK’s Blair government
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has so casually dismissed as fatuous the enterprise of trying to set clear and
unambiguous minimum cash income standards for its grand promises of abol-
ishing child poverty (e.g. Baroness Hollis, House of Lords Hansard, 11 October
1999, col. 165], because its members cannot make sense of this confusion and
see the underlying social science basis as so riven by disagreement and impreci-
sion.
How far do these books clarify these problems and their solutions, so that 
governments prepared to act (many are not) can make better social policy?1 All
three report on surveys, but of many kinds. Researching Poverty is a collection of
thirteen disparate papers by 26 authors, some only peripherally concerned with
poverty research as such. Rowntree’s book tells us how and why he did it the
first time, hardly a model for a century later. Van der Bosch’s book (an expan-
sion of his doctoral thesis) is devoted to the econometricians’ attitudinal survey
approach (the Flemish or income proxy school) but concludes that it is not
enough for a full picture of poverty. Only Rowntree and Van den Bosch discuss
the limitations of method, and many other chapters aim only to show specific
methods in use, but taken together they allow some judgements about the state
of poverty research at the end of the twentieth century, and parts therefore
deserve detailed consideration as examples and guides. Too many other interests
are addressed for discussion in this review, which focuses on the poverty
research methodology issues, not on findings about poor or deprived people and
places.
The first question is, are the methods appropriate for their poverty research
objective? For example, Rowntree wanted to count the poor within the working
class, and for that he had first to identify or describe them. For identification he
used the observable ‘squalid lifestyle’ description of poverty which was conven-
tional then. But he also wanted to explain the appearances, and for this he
devised his primary poverty (P1) measure – if some had too little money even for
physical subsistence (essential to the contemporary ‘efficiency’ discourse), they
certainly did not have enough to avoid a squalid lifestyle.2 Each of these objec-
tives – identification, counting, explanation – was focused on ‘the poor’, not on
‘what is poverty?’ as such. Van den Bosch also wants to identify and count the
poor, but by using measures which report what the population reports on aver-
age as the minimal acceptable income, or which discover an unacceptable
lifestyle suffering an aggregation of conventionally defined deprivations. Here
we already have five distinct purposes for poverty research. Other purposes are
to compare the numbers of the poor over time and between places, and to pre-
scribe income maintenance systems to combat poverty. Perhaps there are more
than these seven purposes, but simply distinguishing them helps to emphasise
the problem of appropriate methodological choices. Some of the authors in the
Bradshaw/Sainsbury collection illustrate these purposes, but some are con-
cerned with data sources or places, which introduces different problems. 
Rowntree’s first book has attracted a century of debate. In the first half, it was
taken as a model for poverty research, but in the second half the development of
sociological methods of enquiry into the meaning of poverty which Peter
Townsend pioneered led to a widespread re-examination of Rowntree’s aims and
methods. To celebrate the centenary, Jonathan Bradshaw has produced a fac-
simile of the first, 1901, edition of Poverty, complete with original maps and pho-
tographs, but inserting his own new, 64 page, preface printed in the same con-
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temporary style. Bradshaw claims that the study’s importance was threefold – it
affected public opinion; it impacted on government policy; and it ‘established the
British tradition of empirical social science research … designed to inform policy …’
(p. xx). Further, for the first time a structural explanation of poverty was offered
based on empirical findings and implying policy conclusions, including (as
Rowntree wrote) ‘the relative duties and powers of the State … affecting the …
distribution of wealth.’ (p. 145). Bradshaw also reminds us that the chapters
reporting on working-class housing conditions and the relationship between
poverty and health fleshed out the lived realities and ‘efficiency’ policy aspects of
what otherwise remain statistics abstracted from context. As a result, the struc-
tural discourse of poverty gained credibility in the UK (apart from some ideologi-
cal digressions). The policy impact was reflected in the Liberal government’s
social reforms through to the Beveridge Report and subsequent social security
policy – though regrettably only at the conceptual level of minimum subsistence.
While some critics argue that Rowntree’s expedient support of P1 for minimum
wage and social assistance policy implies that he believed it to be adequate,
Bradshaw reminds us they overlook his acknowledgement of the arbitrariness of
distinguishing primary from secondary poverty and soon dropped it. Rowntree
later asserted that poverty meant resources inadequate for social participation,
not just ‘physical efficiency’ (Rowntree quoted in Veit-Wilson 1992: 286-7).
Bradshaw’s assessment of Rowntree is wholly positive, but one may doubt if the
heuristically justifiable expedient of P1 should be celebrated, because it had bad
consequences. The public plausibility as adequate of a heuristic tool devised to be
inadequate has subsequently caused mystification and suffering to countless
millions of poor households.3 But historians continue to argue over its signifi-
cance, exemplifying the problems of unacknowledged incompatible understand-
ings of ‘poverty’.4 In the absence of prior clarity, such arguments are fatuous.
Researching Poverty, one of three books which Bradshaw and Sainsbury edited
following the Rowntree centenary conference in 1998, opens with Peter
Townsend’s autobiographical and historically valuable review of poverty
research during the half century in which he has been the leading figure in 
driving the international structural debate. He offers a salutory clarification of
the field – one must always distinguish concepts from operational definitions
(including measures), and from explanation and from policy prescriptions, let
alone what governments actually do. At the same time, he stresses that ‘none …
can be regarded as analytically distinct from the others’: they are all connected.
His development of the sociological empirical approach to mapping what the
population as a whole defines as necessities which nobody should be without,
and what resources are needed not to be forced to be deprived of them and thus
poor, has regrettably been misunderstood by those who dismiss the findings as
subjective, and those, not sharing his egalitarian ideology, who therefore also
reject the integrity of the research methods, their findings and their implications
for policy. Rightly making his value position clear, his writings have not always
distinguished between the other elements of the package deal (Fox 1979), facts
and strategies; indeed, he calls the distinction between the scientific and the
political a false dichotomy. This is tactically dangerous. If his strategic goal is
abolition, he should want to persuade even convinced inegalitarians to accept
the majoritarian approach to identifying social necessities and its statistically
derived poverty boundary even if they do not share his aim of making society
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less unequal. The consequent policies would seem residualist rather than struc-
turalist but at much more generous benefit levels. For Townsend to emphasise
that scientists often tacitly reflect the power holders’ ideology and agenda (thus
endangering the scientific integrity of their poverty research) is arguable but
fails to allow them the equal right to have their world view treated as phenome-
nologically authentic as poor people should also have. Of course Townsend is
right to say that policy is at the heart of the poverty problems social scientists
study – after all, it causes them – but the intellectual ecology of the problems has
to be debated, not dismissed. 
Townsend’s essay is nevertheless an indispensable review of pertinent issues,
with sharp criticisms of the dismissive asociality of many econometric measures,
so beloved of both social scientists and politicians (especially in the World Bank),
as well as of the ‘all poverty measures are arbitrary or subjective’ delusions. He
answers the methodological claim that poverty thresholds cannot be found, as
well as the political resistance of governments to applying scientific measures to
locate them, by pointing out that governments unhesitatingly prescribe norma-
tive thresholds on similar problematic empirical continuums such as radiation,
pollution or nutrition.5 The essay also addresses the operationalisation of the
UN’s global measures of absolute and overall poverty, terms which Townsend
might not have chosen but which he expediently adopts. Here again he elides
the distinction between illuminating analysis and improbable global political
action. It would be a shame if his powerfully far-seeing analysis of global
inequalities (of which poverties are a subset) were rejected by those who would
not accept his prescriptions. The main thrust is clear: every conception of
poverty, from local to global, is inherently caused by political (in)action and
implies its counterfactual, unachievable without political action. No one in the
poverty industry can evade taking a political position on how to deal with it.
The subsequent chapters are less olympian. David Gordon addresses the scien-
tific status of poverty research and distinguishes poverty as too low a level of liv-
ing, which is a normative judgement, from poverty as low income, a matter of
empirical observation. To have a high level of living with a low income is socially
acceptable, as is the converse if based on choice. An empirical threshold, a
poverty line, is that which maximises the difference between the poor and the
non-poor and minimises the difference within each group, but it is a pity that his
figure to illustrate this shows two distinct distributions of low income and high
deprivation scores and the converse, when in principle (and other countries, as
he admits) the distribution might equally show such an intermingling that no
threshold can be seen. The earlier Mack and Lansley (1985) finding that a line
can be reliably drawn between low income correlated with high deprivation
scores and rising income decreasingly correlating with low deprivation scores
seems to me to be more persuasive.6
In a model chapter on how to carry out truly consensual poverty research,
Sue Middleton discusses her work with intensive focus groups to define poverty
and find its budgetary income limits, showing that the method is properly scien-
tific and overcomes the objections to majoritarian imposition, attitudinal random-
ness and budgetary prescription. Her focus groups emphasised children’s cate-
gorical rights to human respect and participation, demanding adequate family
income resources. Previous ‘expert’ budgets were substantially lower because
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the true cash costs of children’s social participation are so undervalued. But
income maintenance systems remain inadequate, and the failure to allow
enough for participation – in practice, people meet social before material needs7
– leads finally to social ills including crime.
A series of technical chapters follows. Some examine the viability of poverty
research resources such as administrative data, the Family Resources Survey,
and historical geographical data. Others report surveys of the problematic rela-
tionships between UK indicators of urban deprivation and government expendi-
ture, and between local deprivations and residents’ attitudes, as well as a
depressed rural overspill town, and problems of electronic exclusion. 
Two final chapters return to what poverty is researched and by whom. John
Washington and colleagues review the history of the European Commission’s
poverty programmes, their inherent assumptions and limitations and the evolu-
tion of the concept of social exclusion. They illustrate the shift from a structural,
lack of resources, perspective to one which emphasises the individual’s deficits
and marginality, a lack of integration where income maintenance is insufficient,
based on a French concern with a Durkheimian conception of solidarity and
integration in social space. This shift to a discourse of social exclusion is given a
rosier gloss here than the cynical political evasion of poverty terminology
reported to me by EC officials in 1994 (Veit-Wilson 1998: 97). The policy impli-
cations thus evasively focus on marginal(ity) symptoms rather than structural
causes. The EC’s analysis of poverty is unsociological but political and has to be
addressed by the antipoverty lobby in those terms. Then the real problem for
poverty research and policy is not multifaceted poverties and social exclusion
(the consequences) but societies and governments which exclude (the cause).
Even here, policies ostensibly aimed at participative integration ends are still viti-
ated by governments refusing the adequate income means.8
Lastly, Ruth Lister and Peter Beresford argue for currently poor people to be
involved in the agenda setting and management of poverty research on experi-
ential grounds (who knows best what poverty is?). If one ignores the problems of
patronisation, selection and tokenism, their case for the co-operative involve-
ment of subjects in research into them is strong. But their polemic is weaker
applied to the epistemologically and methodologically complex aspects of
research into poverty and policy. The deprivation indicator approach, attitudi-
nal surveys and focus group methods all depend upon the representative
responses of the whole population including (but not just) the currently poor.
What matters is rightly the subject’s experience of what is inadequate for decent
life, but that is the whole population.9 Relative deprivation studies as long ago as
Runciman’s (1972), as well as the welfare rights movement, showed that most
people did not want to define themselves or be identified as poor, and the poor
ask for too little. This problematises the question of who are these currently poor
people who are to hold power over research into the whole population, espe-
cially in the light of dynamic poverty research which shows that far more people
have experienced poverty than are poor at any one time (Leisering and Leibfried
1999; Walker and Ashworth 1994). We might prefer minimum income policy
to be based not on what some currently poor people would accept but on what
currently non-poor people will accept when it applies to them – for instance in
minimum pensions.
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A serious question also arises about the implications of this chapter for conse-
quent political changes in the distribution of power and resources. The authors
commend organisations such as ATD which work intensively to enable multiply
deprived people to articulate their views to politicians. Respect is admirable, but
ATD comes from France, the source of the social exclusion approach to poverty
which has socially integrative but not necessarily egalitarian aims. Applied to
poverty research, the whole approach seems to reflect a curiously static hierar-
chical (them and us) view of society.10 Poor people’s involvement in poverty
research cannot substitute for solidaristic political action; the arguments are 
different. 
Van den Bosch’s book is about distinguishing the poor from the non-poor,
that is, finding the income threshold and not the low level of living which it
reflects, the indirect measure which is a proxy for the direct deprivations. For an
econometrician he has some refreshing views on what poverty is and what it is
not – not income inequality (such as HBAI); not low welfare, since poverty is not
a measure of happiness but of economic resources for socially defined function-
ing; not low status or other aspects of class to which economic resource transfers
are irrelevant. His account of the deprivation indicator approach is incomplete,
omitting that it too offers an objective way of finding a poverty line (see the dis-
cussion of Gordon above). He gives a full critical account of the varied uses and
limitations of public attitude surveys to report the income levels which people
believe are barely sufficient for their households, in which he has been involved
for many years, and emphasises both the objectivity of the reliable collection and
manipulation of many subjective opinions, and the problems in finding compre-
hensible and comparably replicable forms of question (‘avoiding poverty’ or
‘making ends meet’ or ‘getting by’ in different languages, times and countries).
He criticises the confusion between what is desirable (incomes above the poverty
line) and what is politically feasible, and deals neatly with the Deleeck fallacy
from the same Flemish stable (that if the responses to the ‘making ends meet’
question exceed the prevailing social assistance scales, the survey responses can-
not be treated as a ‘real’ poverty line (Deleeck et al.1992: 37–8)) by pointing out
that if poverty involves the inability to meet social expectations, the survey
response is valid. Nor, he admits, can econometric techniques resolve what are
the essentially sociological problems of what adequate levels of living are.
Van den Bosch’s conclusions from the many whole population sample surveys
he has been involved with are especially pertinent to this review – that the only
thing distinguishing the currently poor from the rest of society is that ‘they have
a material standard of living that is socially regarded as unacceptable; they do
not share any other characteristic or combination of characteristics that distin-
guishes them from the non-poor. … They cannot be identified on the basis of
behaviour, or any other observable characteristic only’ (p. 412). This under-
mines the Lister/Beresford static behavioural case for involving ‘the poor’ in all
kinds of poverty research, resembling instead the dynamic view that it is the
unacceptability of material conditions to the whole population which needs to be
studied. The conclusion is that if you want to study these behaviours and char-
acteristics then use the appropriate tools (and research collaborators), but don’t
confuse what you find with lack of resources and call it all ‘poverty’. 
If the aim of poverty research is to identify the causes of deprivations and
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exclusions so that political action can remove them, then precision about which
causes and what action is indispensable. As with the need for both preventative
and therapeutic medicine, this may be a matter of both/ands and not either/ors.
However, the persisting reluctance to treat poverty as, first, a lack of simple pur-
chasing power hinders (deliberately, in the case of many politicians) the hard
work of planning and politically implementing adequate income maintenance
systems. Yet until the whole population (of any country) has enough disposable
income to buy what in that context is demonstrably needed for participation, it is
impossible to take the next research step, to discover who nevertheless remains
excluded and what further resources (if any, whether tangible or intangible, 
personal or collective, structural or behavioural) they need to achieve minimal
participation. In modern states, adequate income is the clean water of poverty
policy. While Middleton concludes, ‘Until we can agree some definition of what
poverty is, we cannot sensibly debate its nature, extent or, indeed, how best to
improve the living standards of those experiencing it’ (p. 75), I doubt that a 
single definition is sufficient any more than it is for ‘illness’. Might it not be better
to triangulate the evidence from many different empirical sources and methods
(e.g. deprivation indicators, public attitudes, budget studies, nutritional and
health correlates) to see how far their findings robustly overlap on the types and
levels of resources essential to avoid socially defined deprivations and exclusions
in given contexts? The scientific findings on the necessary income levels and
other resources would then be the essential guide to, and monitor of, the political
judgement of governments where to set minimum income standards, how to
implement them, and thereafter what other anti-exclusionary policies to pursue
– if they really have the political wit or will. 
1 Whatever the many motives for doing poverty research, I assume hopefully that poverty
researchers aim to further prospects for abolition and not only academic careers. 
2 Those who believe that Rowntree saw poverty simply in behavioural terms, concentrating on
the characteristics of people in his ‘secondary poverty’, should remember that unemployment,
drink and gambling were also rife among the rich Victorians without resulting in their visual
identification as poor. As that acute participant observer of the contemporary social scene, 
W C Fields, put it, ‘a rich man is nothing more than a poor man with money’.
3 Rowntree rightly distinguished immediate policy prescription from broader social analysis, and
since P1 was higher than many manual wage levels he expediently recommended it as a provi-
sional target for minimum wages at that time. But less sophisticated people have promoted the
mistaken idea that ‘merely physical subsistence’ actually was an adequate basis for participa-
tory life (and that Rowntree thought so), and have used it to justify inadequate income mainte-
nance levels.
4 Harris considered that my 1986 papers undervalued the importance of Rowntree’s creation of
P1 and undermined the force of his political message, which was not simply to make a rela-
tivistic comparison but to emphasise the economic inefficiencies of poverty (Veit-Wilson
1986a; 1986b; Harris 2000: 67). But I was making a point about scientific paradigms not
political objectives. By contrast, Gillie rejected the originality of P1 which he considered was
appropriated from Rowntree père and Sherwood’s previous work (Rowntree and Sherwood
1899; Gillie 2000: 86–95), and also my interpretation of Rowntree fils’s intentions, for reasons
concerned more with my expressions (where he may be right) than to any understanding of
the broader conceptual argument about the significance of a relativistic rather than merely
subsistence approach for identifying the poor (Gillie 2000: 100–2). Space prevents proper
response to the detailed and somewhat contradictory criticisms made by Harris and Gillie.
While it is diverting to explore disparate interpretations of Rowntree‘s writings, intentions and
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significance, it would have no effect on abuse of Rowntree’s work. The fact that a century later
the United Nations Development Programme’s authoritative briefings incorrectly discuss ‘pri-
mary poverty’ measures as meaningful (UNDP 1999) suggests that the damage from misun-
derstanding Rowntree’s work is too deep-seated for scholastic cure. 
5 In the income case, this would be a politically normative governmental minimum income
standard (see Veit-Wilson 1998). It would help the policy debate if the methodologists would
accept that their findings may at best act as contributions towards and criteria of this political
construct rather than be substitutes for it.
6 Or rather than a hard line, a band of income within which the correlation is increasingly weak.
One can then choose as one’s threshold line the minimal situation at the bottom of the band
where the correlation becomes strong enough, or the optimal situation at the top where it
becomes indistinguishable. Gordon emphasises that whether and where income thresholds
may be found remains contextually contingent; this must also be true of the judgement on
how much correlation is to be taken as reliable. 
7 Maslow’s famous hierarchy of needs (1943) is a theoretical model unsupported by empirical
evidence, except sometimes in concentration camps.
8 Not many people seem aware of the difference between Townsend’s robust use of ‘exclusion’ in
his celebrated definition of poverty, where it is the consequence of lack of material resources, to
the current political weak usage where it is an alternative to addressing their lack.
9 There is also an argument to be furthered that the demand effectively denies the possibility of
Weberian verstehen. Neither sociology nor anthropology would be possible if the assertion that
researchers cannot ‘understand’ their research subjects were dogmatically accepted as univer-
sally valid. It can however be argued and tested case by case pragmatically in context.
10 Some twenty years ago I took part in two meetings of ATD’s Scientific Advisory Committee in
Paris. At that time these traditional religious but conservative values were very apparent:
humane, but their political solidarity was hierarchical not egalitarian.
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